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This paper discusses a top-down analysis methodology for the design, development and evaluation of advanced technological systems like those being considered for Free Flight, the Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiment (AGATE), or the High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) program. In order to ensure a safe and efficient introduction and integration of those technologies, it is generally accepted that human factors engineering concerns must be raised and addressed from the beginning and throughout the research and development cycle. History indicates that human factors engineering concerns were normally addressed too late, contributing significantly to the well known “automation problem” in commercial aviation. In response to the potential for negative side effects advanced technology design guidelines have been developed. This paper focuses on one such guideline concerning sound systems engineering principles.

In this paper we address the role that automation will play in an advanced High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) flight deck. It is argued that an automation philosophy is necessary to optimize design in the face of new technology that creates additional design options and adds to the complexity of the future flight deck design process. An overview of issues that influence the determination of an automation philosophy are presented along with specific items that will be part of that philosophy. We do not provide a comprehensive automation philosophy at this time, however. After a brief summary of Boeing's HSCT program, a detailed definition of automation, as it applies to the flight deck, is provided. A systems approach to flight deck design is described which is based on satisfying the aircraft's non-normal as well as normal mission requirements.

Pilot error is an increasingly critical issue for airframe manufacturers, the FAA, airlines, pilots, and the flying public. While pilot error captures the spotlight, “design error” often underlies pilot error. This paper discusses the differences between systematic (design or procedure induced) and random pilot error and the implications of these classes of error for the cockpit design process. It will be argued that systematic errors can be reduced with design and procedure guidelines based on a better understanding of human error. The danger of attempting to eliminate systematic pilot error through automation will be examined, and the automation-related topics of complacency and skill reduction will be discussed. The need to evaluate the potential for new kinds of errors with the introduction of new automated devices will also be discussed.