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Survivability of combat aircraft has significantly increased with the use of low observable (LO) technology. This technology has dramatically reduced the ability of an air defense to detect, track, intercept and destroy a penetrating stealth aircraft. The Iraqi Desert Storm conflict demonstrated to the world that LO aircraft are a significant threat and they are developing counters to that threat. Many countries are rapidly improving their air defenses by purchasing more advanced radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and integrated air defense systems (IADS). Another defense technique is to concentrate defense elements so there is significant overlap, making it difficult for even stealth aircraft to penetrate. A counter to these defense improvements and highly defended areas is already being used by non-stealth aircraft: standoff weapons. Stealth aircraft can penetrate a hostile airspace and use standoff weapons to attack heavily defended areas with little survivability risk.

The introduction of Low Observable (LO) technology on combat aircraft has produced a leap in aircraft survivability but also raised some difficult questions. How do you quantify survivability, and since new technology tends to be expensive, how LO does an aircraft need to be to accomplish its mission? This paper will show how low observability dramatically improves combat aircraft survivability by reducing an air defense's ability to detect, track, intercept and destroy an LO aircraft. Important aircraft signatures that can be detected such as radar, visual, infrared and intentional emissions are discussed in detail as well as methods to reduce those signatures. LO and mission planning tactics' impacts on threat system capabilities are examined and examples of LO aircraft penetration of a notional hostile air defense are shown.