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ISO 26262 describes a safety engineering approach in which the safety of a system is considered from the early stages of design through a process of elicitation and allocation of system safety requirements. These are expressed as automotive safety integrity levels (ASILs) at system level and are then progressively allocated to subsystems and components of the system architecture. In recent work, we have demonstrated that this process can be automated using a novel combination of model-based safety analysis and optimization metaheuristics. The approach has been implemented in the HiP-HOPS tool, and it leads to optimal economic decisions on component ASILs. In this paper, first, we discuss this earlier work and demonstrate automatic ASIL decomposition on an automotive example. Secondly, we describe an experiment where we applied two different modes of ASIL decomposition.

The number of software-intensive and complex electronic automotive systems is continuously increasing. Many of these systems are safety-critical and pose growing safety-related concerns. ISO 26262 is the automotive functional safety standard developed for the passenger car industry. It provides guidelines to reduce and control the risk associated with safety-critical systems that include electric and (programmable) electronic parts. The standard uses the concept of Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) to decompose and allocate safety requirements of different stringencies to the elements of a system architecture in a top-down manner: ASILs are assigned to system-level hazards, and then they are iteratively decomposed and allocated to relevant subsystems and components. ASIL decomposition rules may give rise to multiple alternative allocations, leading to an optimization problem of finding the cost-optimal allocations.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a well established safety analysis technique used for the assessment of safety critical engineering systems in the automotive industry. Although FMEA has been shown to be useful, the analysis is typically restricted to the effects of single component failures; even partial analysis of combinations or sequences of multiple failures is in practice considered too complex, laborious and costly to perform. In this paper, we describe a new technique in which FMEAs are semi-automatically built from the topology of a system and component-level specifications of failure data. The proposed technique allows an extended form of “combinatorial & sequential FMEA” in which assessment of the effects of combinations and sequences of failures becomes feasible and cost effective.