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Although Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have now for some time been used in segregated airspace where separation from other air traffic can be assured, potential users have interests to deploy UAS in non segregated airspace. Recent technological and operational improvements give reason to believe that UAS safety and performance capabilities are maturing. But the skies can only really open up to UAS when there is an agreed upon UAS safety policy with commonly accepted UAS Safety Risk Management (SRM) processes enabling to show that the risks related to UAS operations in all the different airspace classes can be adequately controlled. The overall objective is to develop a UAS SRM framework, supporting regulators and applicants through provision of detailed guidelines for each SRM step to be conducted, including 1) system description, 2) hazard identification, 3) risk analysis, 4) risk assessment, 5) risk treatment.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) emerge as a viable, operational technology for potential civil and commercial applications in the National Airspace System (NAS). Although this new type of technology presents great potential, it also introduces a need for a thorough inquiry into its safety impact on the NAS. This study presents a systems-level approach to analyze the safety impact of introducing a new technology, such as UAS, into the NAS. Utilizing Safety Management Systems (SMS) principles and the existing regulatory structure, this paper outlines a methodology to determine a mandatory safety baseline for a specific area of interest regarding a new aviation technology, such as UAS Sense and Avoid. The proposed methodology is then employed to determine a baseline set of hazards and causal factors for the UAS Sense and Avoid problem domain and associated regulatory risk controls.